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jurisprudence has allowed private church schools to make great strides in
achieving state funding. At a time where public education is facing criticism
on all sides, it seems natural that school choice supporters are more vocal
than ever. This Essay takes a closer look at private church schools and their
relationship to white supremacy in anticipation of the Court’s decision in
Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin. Ultimately, that case will decide whether states
must fund students taking part in a state school-aid program who choose to
use that aid at sectarian schools without violating the First Amendment.
Situated within the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education and Massive
Resistance, this project examines distinctions between segregation
academies and private church schools. I will argue that while there is a
distinction between church schools and segregation academies, such
schools seem to share the same purpose of maintaining mostly white
classrooms. By examining private church schools through two theoretical
frameworks that underpin Critical Race Theory: racial realism and strategic
racism, I argue that unlike other private schools, church schools are
uniquely situated to preserve white supremacy given their explicit
constitutional protection under the First Amendment—a protection that the
current Supreme Court will likely strengthen in Carson.
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INTRODUCTION
Private religious schools are on a winning streak at the Supreme Court.
Although the question of the State’s role in funding private religious schools
has a long history in Supreme Court jurisprudence,1 the Court has recently
moved toward a strict “no discrimination” approach, holding that states
which fund private schools cannot discriminate against religious schools
when it comes to funding.2 In its third and most recent case on the subject,
Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, the Court has indicated, just how far it is
willing to take this “no discrimination” approach to providing public aid to
private religious schools.3
The battle lines in these sorts of cases are seemingly clear: whereas
some criticize the approach as a perversion of the Court’s First Amendment
religious aid jurisprudence, school choice and religious freedom advocates
have applauded the “no discrimination” approach.4 What both camps largely
overlook, however, is an ugly underbelly in the history—the unavoidable
connection between religious schools and systemic racism. This Essay fills
that gap.

1
See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 717–18 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,
643–45 (2002); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 648 (1971); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 1
(1947) (all decisions dealing with state funding to religious institutions and the Establishment Clause).
2
See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (holding once state
assists in funding private education, it cannot discriminate against private schools that are religious);
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017) (holding Missouri
Department of Natural Resources could not exclude religious preschool and daycare program from public
benefit solely because it was religious).
3
See Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1997 (2022) (holding Maine’s tuition assistance
program violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding religious private schools).
4
For a comprehensive review of responses to the “no discrimination” approach, see G. Alan Tarr,
Espinoza and the Misuses of State Constitutions, 73 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1109, 1111, 1144 (2021).
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Church schools are rooted in the history of desegregation and the public
response to Brown v. Board of Education.5 By focusing primarily on whether
a state discriminates based on religion, the Court has overlooked the role that
church schools play in maintaining white supremacy.6 Thus, in expanding
state aid to private church schools to prevent religious discrimination, the
Court potentially empowers state-funded racial discrimination, perhaps
without even knowing it is doing so.
After Brown, Southern states immediately reorganized their schools to
avoid mandatory integration, a strategy that some scholars have called
“Massive Resistance.”7 Part of these efforts included so-called “segregation
academies.”8 Generally, studies define segregation academies as private
schools founded between 1954 and 1970 in Southern states to aid white
parents in avoiding integrated schools.9
5

For the purposes of this paper, the term “church schools” refers specifically to evangelical private
Christian schools created for the purpose of incorporating the Christian faith and doctrine in primary and
secondary educational settings. See infra Section I.B.
6
For the purposes of this paper, “white supremacy” means the conscious or unconscious desire to
maintain white dominance politically, economically, and culturally through exclusion. See Charles W.
Mills, White Supremacy, in A COMPANION TO AFRICAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 269, 269–81 (Tommy
L. Lott & John P. Pittman eds., 2003); see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1707, 1714, 1736 (1993) (arguing that the primary premise of whiteness is the right to exclude, a
premise that whiteness shares with the definition of property).
7
For a more detailed definition of Massive Resistance, see infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text;
see also JEFFREY L. LITTLEJOHN & CHARLES H. FORD, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: DESEGREGATION AND
RESEGREGATION IN NORFOLK’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 49–51 (2012) (discussing how Virginia, and
specifically Norfolk, became a battleground for Massive Resistance after Brown). For the assertion that
private schools were a strategy of Massive Resistance, see Anthony M. Champagne, The Segregation
Academy and the Law, 42 J. NEGRO EDUC. 58, 58, 61 (1973) (arguing “tremendous hostility arose in the
white community toward integration” and thus segregated private schools became the “new vehicle for
evading the principle of integrated education”).
8
See Norman Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in “Private” Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 39, 41
(1967) (discussing the role of private schools in the Massive Resistance to integrated public education);
see also JOSEPH CRESPINO, IN SEARCH OF ANOTHER COUNTRY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE CONSERVATIVE
COUNTERREVOLUTION 9 (2007) (stating that in Mississippi, segregation academies were a part of the
resistance movement following Brown, a movement that gave way to “more subtle, color-blind political
language” as time passed); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436, 1436 (1973)
(stating that integration efforts in the South were nullified by the “establishment of a ‘private’ school
system”).
9
In this Essay, I have intentionally spelled white with a lowercase and Black with an uppercase
following the lead of other authors who make this decision intentionally as a form of reclamation. See,
e.g., Mike Laws, Why We Capitalize ‘Black’ (and Not ‘white’), COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 16,
2020), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/capital-b-black-styleguide.php#:~:text=The%20first%20is%20broad%
20adherence,suspended%20if%20%E2%80%9Ca%20particular%20author [https://perma.cc/X4TD-PRX
Z] (explaining that capitalizing Black acts to reclaim a shared identity and culture). For definitions and
examples of segregation academies, see Jeremy R. Porter, Frank M. Howell & Lynn M. Hempel, Old
Times Are Not Forgotten: The Institutionalization of Segregationist Academies in the American South,
61 SOC. PROBS. 576, 583–84 (2014); see also Sarah Carr, In Southern Towns, ‘Segregation Academies’
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Scholars who study the development of segregation academies
commonly conflate nonsectarian private schools with evangelical Christian
schools (church schools).10 Some of these scholars, however, have
recognized in passing that the corresponding rise of church schools alongside
segregation academies does not necessarily mean that the two served the
same exclusive discriminatory purpose.11 These scholars acknowledge the
complex reasons for the rise in church schools in the 1970s and 1980s, but
they do so only to highlight the role that segregation may have played in
forming the politics of conservative white Christians.12 Thus, church schools
are either mentioned as a footnote to the broader topic of segregation
academies, or referenced briefly as a catalyst of the religious right
movement.13
But church schools require a more nuanced examination if we want to
truly comprehend white supremacy’s role in the use of religion as a tool to
maintain the racial status quo—which becomes increasingly important as the
Supreme Court continues to validate and encourage the public funding of

Are Still Going Strong, ATLANTIC (Dec. 13, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
12/in-southern-towns-segregation-academies-are-still-going-strong/266207/ [https://perma.cc/GZC5-JT
Y2] (discussing person of color’s firsthand experience living in community with segregation academy).
10
See, e.g., Porter et al., supra note 9, at 584 (describing scholars who conflate the two). One
exception is Rachel Winstead’s Honors Thesis. Pointedly, she states that “to fully understand . . . racism,
[nonsectarian private schools and sectarian private] schools must be understood as fundamentally distinct
from one another.” Rachel Winstead, Basements Below the Sanctuary: A Story of the Church School 3–
4 (May 9, 2020) (B.A. honors thesis, University of Mississippi), https://egrove.olemiss.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2589&context=hon_thesis [https://perma.cc/HM3S-BGKB]). Similarly, this
paper argues that church schools and nonsectarian segregated academies were initially distinct. However,
Winstead’s work and mine differ in that she examines the history of one school in Mississippi, whereas I
examine church schools broadly and in relation to the Supreme Court’s current expansive religious aid
jurisprudence.
11
See, e.g., CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13, 255 (recognizing other issues beyond integration
mobilized and politicized the Christian right); SETH DOWLAND, FAMILY VALUES AND THE RISE OF THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT 30 (2015) (arguing white parents sent their children to church schools for a variety of
reasons that included but were not limited to avoiding desegregation).
12
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13, 255; DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 30 (describing how
“government schools” were painted as “places of disorder and chaos”).
13
For the purposes of this paper, the term “religious right” refers to the conservative political
mobilization of evangelical Christians started in the 1960s and 1970s to fight perceived culture wars on
a variety of issues––such as abortion, desegregation, and the secularization of public schools. See
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13; see also Randall Balmer, The Real Origins of the Religious Right,
POLITICO (May 27, 2014), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-real-origins
-107133/ [https://perma.cc/RXQ7-GNL4] (noting origins of religious right are intimately connected with
school segregation).
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these schools.14 Such a nuanced examination likely has not occurred because
none of the religious schools implicated in the Court’s recent decisions were
located in Southern states.15 Because the history highlighting a relationship
between segregation academies and church schools exists exclusively in the
context of southern Massive Resistance, the Court has overlooked this link
in deciding these recent non-southern cases. Nevertheless, decisions from the
Supreme Court apply nationally and will apply to Southern states—so this
history is relevant.
This Essay supplements the story by situating the Court’s recent trilogy
of private religious school funding cases within the history of southern
church schools and white supremacy. Throughout this Essay, I argue that
southern church schools, even if created for a purpose encompassing more
than the maintenance of white supremacy, share in that purpose by their
historical connection to segregation academies and their modern
preservation of mostly white spaces. Segregation academies and southern
church schools share a fundamental link: they demonstrate the ability of
white supremacy to use religion as a tool to preserve racism and the status
quo in America.
By highlighting the relationship between white supremacy and southern
church schools, this Essay warns of potential unintended consequences of
the Court’s recent expansive religious freedom revolution. Part I describes
the history and development of segregation academies in the South, as well
as the creation of church schools in relationship to segregation academies. In
this Part, I argue that modern church schools, whether explicitly started as
segregation academies or not, tend to incorporate the vestiges of segregation
by inculcating students with cultural values rooted in white supremacy. This
can manifest in a variety of ways, such as in providing a mostly segregated
education, teaching a curriculum that focuses on American nationalism and
exceptionalism rooted in whiteness, or both.16
Part II bridges segregation academies and church schools by arguing
that through their embrace of the language of individual rights,
segregationists maintained white supremacy through more implicit means.
Drawing on Critical Race Theory methodology, I demonstrate this implicit
14
See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2257 (2020). Additionally, the Supreme
Court just decided Carson v. Makin, holding that states may not prohibit private religious schools from
receiving direct aid without violating the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution. Carson ex rel. O.C. v.
Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1997 (2022).
15
See, e.g., Carson, 142 S. Ct. at 1993 (Maine); Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2251 (Montana); Trinity
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017) (Missouri).
16
One day, I hope to expand this project to also examine the specific curricula used in these schools
to determine whether such material incorporates/teaches norms rooted in white supremacy. However, for
the purposes of this Essay, I will only mention and discuss curriculum superficially in Part II.
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embrace of white supremacy by applying the lens of racial realism and
strategic racism to analyze the desegregation of southern church schools.
Central to this analysis is my claim that church schools are uniquely situated,
based on First Amendment protections, to preserve white supremacy without
serious federal oversight. This strategy of using church schools to maintain
white supremacy will likely be more successful under the current Supreme
Court’s religious aid jurisprudence.
Importantly, this Essay does not argue that these schools should not
exist. Church schools seek to teach values thought to be rooted in Christian
faith and doctrine.17 As such, nothing in this Essay suggests that church
schools are inherently racist or are hiding behind a religious smokescreen.
Instead, this Essay serves as a reminder that judicial decisions have
national—and often unacknowledged—consequences for marginalized
groups.
I.

THE HISTORY OF SEGREGATION ACADEMIES AND CHURCH SCHOOLS

In this Part, I detail the development and history of segregation
academies and church schools in the South and explain how church schools
compare to segregation academies.
Section I.A offers an overview of segregation academies generally—
explaining the development of these schools as a means of southern Massive
Resistance in the years after the Court reached its decision in Brown v. Board
of Education. As an example of the phenomenon of segregation academies
that arose in the South in the 1960s and 1970s, I highlight the school closures
and segregation academies that developed in Virginia during this time.
In Section I.B, I distinguish segregation academies from church
schools. Section I.B compares and contrasts church schools and argues that
it would be a mistake to view church schools as synonymous with
segregation academies. In addition, Section I.B provides the reader with
context as to the Bob Jones decision—a decision that, while often read as
preventing church schools from participating in racial discrimination, in fact
can be viewed as opening the door to First Amendment protections for
church schools that participate in subtler forms of racial discrimination.

17

See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249.
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A. Segregation Academies Generally
In the spring of 1954, the New York Times boldly proclaimed, “High
Court Bans School Segregation,” on its front page.18 Chief Justice Warren
delivered the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, denouncing the “separate but equal” doctrine19—at least in the
field of public education—and declaring segregated schools violative of the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.20 The Court held that
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”21 Yet, even the
Court appreciated the difficulties that would come with enforcing mandatory
desegregation, as it hesitated to provide instructions on implementation until
a year later.22
Such hesitation was not unwarranted. States, especially in the South,
immediately reacted to mandatory desegregation with outrage and violence.23
The years of active defiance following Brown are known as a time of
“[M]assive [R]esistance” due to the rapid and immense opposition to
desegregation.24 In some states, like Texas and Arkansas, the resistance
quickly grew violent, culminating in attacks from angry mobs of white
people set on preventing Black students from desegregating schools.25 Other
states simply refused to comply with Brown, choosing instead to shut down
their schools.26 Virginia took this route in places such as Charlottesville,
Prince Edward County, and Norfolk.27
18
Luther A. Huston, High Court Bans School Segregation; 9-to-0 Decision Grants Time to Comply,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1954, at 1.
19
The term “separate but equal” comes from the Court’s prior decision in Plessy v. Ferguson where
it held that railroad train segregation laws did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment so long as the
railroad train facilities were equal. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–52, (1896).
20
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), supp’d, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
21
Id.
22
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
23
Champagne, supra note 7, at 60; Note, supra note 8, at 1437.
24
Champagne, supra note 7, at 60; Note, supra note 8, at 1437.
25
Note, supra note 8, at 1437.
26
See Champagne, supra note 7, at 60; see also Nancy MacLean, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP
HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA 62 (2017) (noting that in Virginia the
1956 General Assembly implemented legislation that closed any white school that planned on complying
with integration).
27
See Champagne, supra note 7 at 60; Note, supra note 8, at 1438 n.16. I focus on Virginia because,
despite the extreme levels of resistance to desegregation in Virginia, current segregation academy
scholarship is mostly concerned with states in the Deep South, with a heightened focus on Mississippi.
See, e.g., CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13 (focusing exclusively on segregation academies in Mississippi);
Marilyn Grady & Sharon C. Hoffman, Segregation Academies Then and School Choice Configurations
Today in Deep South States, 2 CONTEMP. ISSUES EDUC. LEADERSHIP 1, 1 (2018) (focusing exclusively on
“Deep South” states and leaving out Virginia); Bracey Harris, Reckoning with Mississippi’s ‘Segregation
Academies’, HECHINGER REP. (Nov. 29, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/reckoning-with-mississippis-
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Two locations in particular, Norfolk and Prince Edward County, best
illustrate the gravity of Virginia’s strategic approach to Massive Resistance.
In the aftermath of Brown, Virginia’s General Assembly developed a plan
that “authorized the governor to close or cease funding integrated public
schools.”28 Thus, the logic of the General Assembly seems to hold that there
could be no desegregation if there were no public schools. This allowed
school boards in Norfolk and Prince Edward County to avoid desegregation
by closing schools. Thus, reopening these schools would require orders from
federal courts.29
In Norfolk, the governor closed six all-white schools after the Norfolk
school board authorized seventeen Black students to attend those schools in
1958.30 This school closure lasted from September 1958 until February 1959,
when a federal court order required the Norfolk school board to reopen the
closed schools.31 Although shorter in duration than other school closures, the
Norfolk closure affected more students than any other in Virginia.32 As a
result, Norfolk’s closure was a prime example of Massive Resistance in
Virginia—putting it at the forefront of public discourse over desegregation.33
While Norfolk’s closure demonstrated the sweeping extent of Virginia’s
Massive Resistance, Prince Edward’s closure revealed its longevity.34 In
Prince Edward County, the school closure lasted from 1959 until 1964—ten
years after Brown.35 Unlike all other public schools in Virginia, Prince
Edward County kept its public schools closed despite the General
Assembly’s decision to move away from this form of Massive Resistance.36
segregation-academies/ [https://perma.cc/QHG7-BTHN] (recent segregation academy report focused
exclusively on Mississippi).
28
Note, supra note 8, at 1437; see Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221 (1964) (noting Virginia
General Assembly created legislation to close or defund integrated schools).
29
See Note, supra note 8, at 1437–38; see also LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 7, at 112–13
(detailing Federal Judge Hoffman’s reasoning for requiring the reopening of Norfolk’s schools); Dorsen,
supra note 8, at 43 (providing a detailed analysis of the Prince Edward County situation, including how the
schools in that county were finally reopened only through a federal court order).
30
LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 7, at 77–78.
31
Id. at 78, 102.
32
The closure displaced 9,930 white students and seventeen Black students. Id. at 78. Littlejohn and
Ford provide a comprehensive overview of the Massive Resistance that took place in Norfolk. See
generally id. at 78–79, 99–104.
33
See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Virginia Loses Court Plea for Delay on Integration, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1958, at 1 (discussing Norfolk school closure specifically in connection to Virginia statewide legal
request for delays in immediate integration).
34
This is not to suggest that the Norfolk closure did not have lasting effects on the students. It is just
meant to highlight the length of time that the Prince Edward County closure existed in contrast to Norfolk,
where the closure was only one year, but affected a larger population of students.
35
Dorsen, supra note 8, at 42–43.
36
See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221–23 (1964).
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Black students in Prince Edward County went without any formal education
until 1963.37 The public schools only reopened in 1964 because the Supreme
Court held that Prince Edward County’s school closure violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.38 The lasting implication of the closure for Black
students continues today.39
Though school closures meant no school at all for some Black students,
the same was not true for white students.40 Instead, localities in Virginia
created and developed private schools that white students could attend
outside of the legal reach of Brown, which only applied to public education.41
Additionally, Virginia’s government provided white parents with grants to
assist with the financial cost of private schools.42 After much litigation,
however, the Eastern District of Virginia deemed the grants unconstitutional
in 1969 because they provided state funding to a “racially segregated
education.”43 Other Southern states used this loophole in Brown to maintain
segregated private institutions, appropriately called segregation academies.44
Once the courts invalidated Massive Resistance in the form of school
closings, Southern states such as Virginia put their energy into private
schools and “freedom of choice” plans.45
37
Id. at 223; see also JILL OGLINE TITUS, BROWN’S BATTLEGROUND: STUDENTS, SEGREGATIONISTS,
& THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 10 (2011) (arguing in the wake of
resistance to Brown, Black students in Prince Edward County lost even the “substandard system [of
education] that had stood at the heart of the black community for decades”).
38
Griffin, 377 U.S. at 225.
39
For example, the Black students prohibited from being educated during this time never truly
recovered from their lack of education—thus they were left illiterate, which meant they could not assist
their kids with homework or obtain jobs paying more than minimum wage. TITUS, supra note 37, at 10,
204.
40
See Dorsen, supra note 8, at 43; see also TITUS, supra note 37, at 31–34 (describing in detail the
way in which the Prince Edward School Board assisted in creating and supporting a private school for
white children). Further, this reinforced the notion that separate and unequal was to be the law of the
land. Even when shutting down schools, state education systems treated Black children unequally.
41
Champagne, supra note 7, at 65–66; Note, supra note 8, at 1438.
42
See Dorsen, supra note 8, at 42–43.
43
Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969).
44
In Southern states like Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia, combined enrollment in private schools increased by “roughly 2,000 percent”
between 1966 and 1972. Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 2, 6; see Champagne, supra note 7, at 58;
Note, supra note 8, at 1436.
45
Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1964). For the purposes of this Essay, “freedom
of choice” plans refer to the notion of putting school selection in the hands of parents and not the government,
ultimately giving parents the right to send their kids where they want to, even if that means sending them to an
all-white school. See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 173. For more analysis on the connection between
segregation academies and modern school choice plans, see generally Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27
(detailing history of segregation academies and school choice plans); see also Martha Minow,
Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 816
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Even though the Court decided Brown in 1954, many white parents only
flocked toward segregation academies following the Civil Rights Act of
1964.46 There were a few reasons for this delay. Due to the imprecise
language in Brown II, localities were allowed to determine how and when
desegregation would occur, leading to “a range of legal and extra-legal
strategies” that frustrated integration.47 These legal strategies included a shift
in linguistic focus from the issue of white segregation based on racial
superiority to the issue of private choice.48 Additionally, in the 1970s, the
economy in the South began to grow, “provid[ing] many middle-class
families with the economic means to afford private tuition.”49 Thus, the
number of students in private schools expanded tremendously in the late
1960s and early 1970s amid public schools beginning to truly integrate.50
For this reason, the baseline definition of a segregation academy is a
private school founded in the South sometime between the late 1960s and
the early 1970s.51 This timeline is significant because while private schools
(both nonsectarian and sectarian) existed in small quantities prior to Brown,
they exploded during the 1960s and 1970s. For example, the Yale Law
Journal estimated in 1973 that total enrollment in private schools increased
from 25,000 students in 1966 to 535,000 by 1972.52 Segregated academies
are thus distinguished from parochial and church schools by the “timing and
conditions under which they emerged.”53
At times, the baseline definition of a segregation academy above is
supplemented by the requirement that the private school received state funds
as an explicit attempt by Southern states to avoid desegregation.54 For
example, in 1973, the Yale Law Journal defined segregation academies as
schools fitting the founding date requirement that were “first operated with
tuition grants from state governments.”55 By contrast, Anthony
Champagne—publishing around the same time as the Yale Law Journal
(2011) (exploring school choice rhetoric over the last century and noting specifically that the slogan has
encompassed both “resistance to school desegregation and tactics to achieve it”).
46
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 9; Porter et al., supra note 9, at 578.
47
Porter et al., supra note 9, at 578.
48
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 9; Champagne, supra note 7, at 61.
49
Porter et al., supra note 9, at 578.
50
Note, supra note 8, at 1441–42.
51
Id.; Champagne, supra note 7, at 58; see also CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249 (stating that early
nonsectarian private schools after Brown were founded in the 1960s and early 1970s and that it is not until after
1976 that private Christian schools start to dominate the private school distribution).
52
Note, supra note 8, at 1441.
53
Porter et al., supra note 9, at 577–78.
54
Dorsen, supra note 8, at 44–45; Note, supra note 8, at 1444–47.
55
Note, supra note 8, at 1444–45.

55

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

article—used the founding date requirement but chose to omit state funding
from the definition of segregation academies, finding these direct grants
from states were “no longer common.”56 Regardless of whether the definition
includes direct monetary support from the state, segregation academies were
created in the 1960s and 1970s as the result of white supremacist ideology
focused on perpetuating white dominance through white exclusivity.57
Despite Brown, segregationists had a particularly vested interest in keeping
all-white schools.
Scholars typically limit their research on segregated academies to
schools located in Mississippi or other Deep South states such as Louisiana,
Alabama, South Carolina, and Georgia.58 These states led resistance to the
Civil Rights Movement which often turned violent. For example, between
1954 and 1964, some of the “most ghastly, high-profile acts of racial
violence”—such as the violent murder of Emmett Till—occurred in
Mississippi.59 Thus, Mississippi, and states similarly situated, remain the
focus of projects looking at the history of segregated academies.60
In particular, Mississippi receives a lot of focus because it was home to
“the first significant organization of segregationist resistance, the Citizens’
Council.”61 The White Citizens’ Council’s first chapter was in Indianola,
Mississippi.62 Indianola is also home to a notable Mississippi segregation
academy, Indianola Academy, which is still open today.63 As a part of its
segregationist strategy, the Citizens’ Council led fundraising efforts that
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Champagne, supra note 7, at 58. Yet, as the Supreme Court continues to endorse state funding to
religious schools, these types of grants may be well on their way to being common again. See infra Section
II.B. It begs the question: would segregation academies have been successful under the current Court’s
jurisprudence?
57
See Champagne, supra note 7, at 63 (discussing use of private property right to exclude as a way
to enforce segregation); see also Dorsen, supra note 8, at 41 (concluding private schools were being used
to resist integration in order to maintain “lily-white schools”). For more on white dominance through
white exclusivity, see Harris, supra note 6, at 1736.
58
See generally Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27 (focusing on Deep South states); CRESPINO, supra
note 8 (discussing racial violence and extremism in Deep South); Note, supra note 8 (discussing segregation
academies in Southern states).
59
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 5. The University of Mississippi riot of 1962 also served as another
high-profile example of the racial violence in Mississippi during this period. See JAMES MEREDITH,
THREE YEARS IN MISSISSIPPI 223–24 (1966). The riot occurred due to the admittance of James Meredith,
a Black man, to the school. Id. at 223.
60
See generally Porter et al., supra note 9 (focusing exclusively on the South); Carr, supra note 9
(addressing the continued presence of segregation academies in Mississippi).
61
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 5.
62
Michael W. Fuquay, Civil Rights and the Private School Movement in Mississippi, 1964–1971,
42 HIST. EDUC. Q. 159, 161 (2002).
63
Carr, supra note 9.
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funded private schools in Mississippi with both public and private money.64
The Citizens’ Council was instrumental to the proliferation of private
segregated schools in Mississippi and beyond.65
Segregation academies remained formally segregated until 1976, when
the Supreme Court required them to integrate in Runyon v. McCrary.66 The
Court closed the private school loophole to Brown by holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, a federal law against private discrimination in contracts, “prohibits
private schools from excluding qualified children solely because they are
Negroes.”67 Yet, this decision did not substantively change the racial makeup
of the former segregation academies, and many of these schools remained
majority-white schools.68 A study on the survival of segregation academies
found that areas in which “whites formally organized during [the] civil rights
movement have higher rates of enrollment in academies relative to other
communities in the South.”69 This suggests that the original purpose of
segregation academies—to further white dominance through exclusion of
Black students—persists today.
B. Distinguishing Church Schools
With few exceptions, scholars have historically conflated church
schools founded during the 1960s and 1970s with the general definition of
segregation academies.70 This is understandable because evangelical church
64
Fuquay, supra note 62, at 164–65. For more information on the Citizens’ Council’s creation and
purpose, see generally STEPHANIE R. ROLPH, RESISTING EQUALITY: THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL, 1954–1989
(2018).
65
See Fuquay, supra note 62, at 159.
66
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 164–67, 186 (1976).
67
Importantly, Runyon also reaffirmed the right of private schools to teach whatever material they
wanted, including segregationist dogma. Id. at 163, 175, 177; see 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (providing that people
in the United States can make and enforce contracts regardless of race).
68
See Porter et al., supra note 9, at 594; see also Carr, supra note 9 (describing a segregation academy
that continues to have majority-white enrollment).
69
Porter et al., supra note 9, at 595.
70
See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 7, at 59 (including parochial schools in table estimating growth
in private schools between the 1960s and 1970s); Note, supra note 8, at 1444–47 (including “Christian
Academies” in definition of segregation academies); Ellen Ann Fentress, White Churches Involved at
Every Step, THEACADEMYSTORIES)https://www.theacademystories.com/post/White-churches-involvedat-every-step [https://perma.cc/Y979-XSEV] (arguing segregation academies found legal shelter under
church schools). For exceptions, see DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26–27 (recognizing difference between
church schools and segregation academies); CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13 (describing different treatment
of segregation academies and church schools in Mississippi); Winstead, supra note 10, at 3–4
(emphasizing importance of distinguishing between church schools and segregation academies). In 1967,
Professor Norman Dorsen distinguished between the two types of schools, but only to examine whether
the First Amendment would prohibit the state from dismantling segregation in sectarian schools. Dorsen,
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schools also started to flourish in the 1960s and 1970s amid increased efforts
to desegregate local schools.71 As the founding of these schools overlap, it is
easy to assume that they were created for the same purpose: to maintain white
supremacy by avoiding desegregation.72 In reality, however, the history is
more complicated.
Southern churches played an extensive role in maintaining resistance to
desegregation.73 Even churches that did not create schools indicated their
approval of segregation academies by allowing those academies to use
church buildings for classes.74 An example of this arrangement occurred in
Indianola, Mississippi: Following a 1970 federal court ruling prohibiting
formal segregation in local public schools, white parents pulled their students
out of the public schools and enrolled them in the segregated Indianola
Academy.75 The Academy, however, lacked the necessary capacity in its own
facilities to house all the white public school students, so it held classes on
satellite campuses—one of which was in a Baptist church.76 Another
example occurred in Prince Edward County, Virginia—while public schools
were shut down, white churches “offered the new Prince Edward Academy
use of their buildings free of charge.”77 It is thus unsurprising that scholars
typically conflate private church schools with segregation academies.
Though the connection between segregation academies and church
schools is readily apparent, it would be a mistake to conflate them.78 An
adequate account of the complex social and historical context of the
development of church schools is necessary to understand both the history
and sustainability of these schools.79 In contrast to the timeline of segregation
academies, enrollment in non-Catholic church schools increased by 137%
supra note 8, at 54–58. That argument is outdated by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bob Jones University
v. United States because the Court allows the federal government, indirectly through the taxing power, to
prevent church schools from segregating. 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983).
71
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249. I specify evangelical schools because Catholic parochial schools
existed prior to any desegregation efforts and in some places, like Norfolk, were among the first schools
to desegregate. See LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 7, at 54; Note, supra note 8, at 1443.
72
Winstead, supra note 10, at 3.
73
See PAUL HARVEY, CHRISTIANITY AND RACE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 189–90 (2016); see also
Winstead, supra note 10, at 22 (arguing many Christians at the time of Massive Resistance found white
supremacy and Christianity inseparable).
74
See LITTLEJOHN & FORD, supra note 7, at 174; Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 5; Fentress,
supra note 70.
75
Carr, supra note 9.
76
Id.
77
TITUS, supra note 37, at 34.
78
See DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 30.
79
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249 (describing prevalence of southern church schools and values that
supported growth); Winstead, supra note 10, at 8 (explaining how conflating church schools with segregation
academies erases the complexity behind narratives of white supremacy).
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between 1970 and 1980.80 This increase begins at the tail end of the
segregation academies timeline making it easy to assume that desegregation
also influenced the creation of church schools. Other changes, however, such
as the perceived secularization of the public school system by the Supreme
Court, also contributed to the creation of church schools.81
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court decided both Engel v. Vitale and
School District of Abington v. Schempp, initiating the perception of public
school secularization.82 In Engel, the Court held that sectarian public school
prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.83
Likewise, in Schempp, the Court held that Bible reading and the saying of
The Lord’s Prayer in public school violated the Establishment Clause.84 In
conservative Protestant households, these two decisions amounted to an
attack on core values and the Christian faith, which led to the creation of
more church schools to combat the perceived secular indoctrination of white
children.85
Additionally, in the late 1970s, conservative white Christians united
and mobilized against several perceived culture wars, such as those
regarding abortion, gay rights, and the Equal Rights Amendment
movement.86 This mobilization, commonly known as the rise of the religious
right, was a movement against a perceived threat to the white Christian way
of life that included, but was not limited to, desegregation.87 This mix of
values allowed for the rhetoric of the religious right to conceal its racist
origins and bond evangelicalism with political conservatism.88

80

DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 23.
Evangelical churches largely sponsored these schools, and as such, taught curricula deeply rooted
in evangelical theology. CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249.
82
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224–26 (1963).
Dowland provides a detailed analysis on the impact these two cases had on white Christian parents’ views
that public schools were too secularized. DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 23, 30–33.
83
Engel, 370 U.S. at 424.
84
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
85
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 23. Interestingly, the same justices who decided these two cases also
decided Brown and other prointegration cases, which were seen to be an attack on the white family and
core values.
86
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13.
87
Id.; Balmer, supra note 13.
88
See Rolph, supra note 64, at 160; DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 2; see also Balmer, supra note 13
(arguing religious right’s targeting of abortion was simply a more palatable rallying cry to hide their real
motive of “protecting segregated schools”).
81
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Admittedly, segregationists were often the same people who were
intimately involved in fighting these religious culture wars.89 This
demonstrates the compatibility of the white supremacist agenda and the
religious right. As a by-product of the movement to provide white parents
with an alternative to “secular” values, southern churches created church
schools.90 The religious right successfully distinguished their religious
schools from segregation academies by emphasizing issues other than
desegregation—namely the apparent attack on religious values.91
Thus, the conflation of church schools and segregation academies is
problematic because only a few church schools actually qualify under the
technical definition of a segregation academy. Church schools really
increased in popularity from the late 1970s through the early 1980s, partly
due to the Supreme Court’s decisions on prayer and religious teaching in
public schools and partly due to the rise of the religious right.92 In contrast,
the term segregation academy refers specifically to schools founded after the
1954 Brown decision and into the 1970s.93 Conflating church schools with
segregation academies allows church schools to defend against any
accusation of segregation by arguing that their existence is rooted in
theology, not white supremacy. In other words, by failing to properly
distinguish church schools from the more overtly white supremacist
segregation academies, legal scholarship has allowed church schools to
circumvent responsibility for their own unique role in perpetuating white
supremacy.
On another note, during this time church schools’ protection under the
First Amendment had not been lost on the courts, the public, or
segregationists.94 Due to this protection, it was not until 1982, in Bob Jones
89

See Balmer, supra note 13; see also KEVIN M. KRUSE, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW
CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN AMERICA 203–04, 205 (2015) (describing role
segregationists played in school prayer debate in Congress).
90
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13, 249. This fight against “secular values” in education continues as
a narrative for supporting both church schools and homeschooling alternatives. See for example the recent
evangelical movie, God’s Not Dead 4: We the People, a movie directed and produced by evangelical
Christians, which centers around Christians defending their homeschooling curriculum from government
officials. GOD’S NOT DEAD: WE THE PEOPLE (Pinnacle Peak Pictures 2021).
91
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249.
92
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 23. This is likely the reason why Porter, Howell, and Hempel found
that looking into church schools in their modern study of segregation academies, while valid, would
render few samples. See Porter et al., supra note 9, at 584.
93
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 9; Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 5; Porter et al., supra note
9, at 578; Note, supra note 8, at 1441–44.
94
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (noting that the case did not present the question
of whether § 1981 clashed with the practices of “private sectarian schools that practice racial exclusion
on religious grounds”); Lesley Oelsner, High Court Curbs Private Schools on Racial Barrier, N.Y. TIMES,

60

117:46 (2022)
Revolution

The Unintended Consequences of the Court's Religious Freedom

University v. United States, that the Supreme Court explicitly addressed
racial discrimination in church schools.95 The outcome of this case
practically prohibited church schools from participating in racial
discrimination.96 The Court accomplished this by holding that the Internal
Revenue Service’s removal of tax-exempt status from organizations that
racially discriminate is not unconstitutional under the First Amendment.97
In Bob Jones, the Court is intentional about addressing the First
Amendment question. Basing its decision on twenty-five years of Supreme
Court precedent and the “myriad Acts of Congress and Executive Orders”
against educational segregation, the Court held that the government’s strong
interest in preventing racial discrimination outweighed any restriction on
religious free exercise.98 Yet, this requirement for a strong governmental
interest, which relies on precedent and complies with the political behavior
of the time, suggests that whether the First Amendment protects the actions
of a church school will be fact specific and that explicit racial discrimination
is likely required for a removal of tax-exempt status. Therefore, even in Bob
Jones, the Court reinforced the potential protections afforded to church
schools by the First Amendment, protections that could be strengthened
under a pro-religious freedom Court.
In sum, not taking southern church schools as distinct vehicles of white
supremacy seriously limits our understanding of the role desegregation has
played in the evolution and mixing of white supremacy and religion in the
United States. This is especially true considering that by 1976, southern
church schools outnumbered the older segregation academies.99 It is
June 26, 1976, at 1; see also CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 9. I explore the potential current relevancy of this
protection in modern constitutional jurisprudence in greater length in Part II.
95
See generally 461 U.S. 574 (1982) (deciding whether private church schools can maintain taxexempt status). The D.C. Circuit had previously addressed the tax-exempt status of church schools in
Green v. Connally, putting the religious right on notice and causing many church schools to change their
admission requirements to allow Black students, but it was not until Bob Jones that the Supreme Court
affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.D.C. 1971).
Crespino discusses the religious right’s leaders’ reactions to Connally in detail. CRESPINO, supra note 8,
at 254–55.
96
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603–04.
97
Id. at 604. For the specific IRS rule that prohibits tax-exempt organizations from discriminating,
see Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. The rule includes reporting requirements that require an
organization to report on its racial demographics as well as a public-facing requirement that stipulates the
antidiscriminatory nature of the organization. The IRS updated the public-facing requirement in 2019 to
allow internet disclosures. Rev. Proc. 2019-22, 2019-22 I.R.B. It should also be noted that this decision
has rarely been applied to take away a church school’s tax-exempt status. See DOWLAND, supra note 11,
at 46.
98
Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 593, 603–04.
99
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 249.
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significant, then, that church schools are distinguishable from segregation
academies. If church schools occupy a different space than do segregation
academies, then all church schools—not just those created in the 1960s and
1970s—should be considered in examining the evolution and adaptation of
white supremacy.100
II. SHARING PURPOSE: MAINTAINING WHITE SUPREMACY
Given that Bob Jones scrutinized race-based exclusion in schools,
private segregation in education—whether in segregation academies or
church schools—should have faced complete eradication. And to the extent
that the federal government now prohibits these schools from actively
preventing Black student attendance, private segregation no longer legally
exists. Legal prohibition, however, has not translated to real extinction. This
is especially true when the underlying action—educational segregation—is
understood for its true function: the maintenance and indoctrination of white
supremacy.
After Brown and its progeny made it legally unacceptable to maintain
white supremacy in public educational spaces, segregationists moved to
private ones.101 But even this strategy became more difficult after Runyon
extended the prohibition of educational segregation to private spaces.102
Because of these Civil Rights Era decisions, segregationists needed to
discover more subtle ways to maintain white supremacy in education.
Accordingly, segregationists embraced the language and discourse of
individual liberties, rights, and private property as alternative ways to argue
for ideas and policies that resulted in the continuation of white-dominated
spaces.103
Professor Christopher Schmidt suggests that this shift is politically and
socially acceptable because it moves the conversation of civil rights “from a
question of white supremacy versus equality toward a question of liberty
versus equality.”104 Beyond the general political and social acceptability of
this shift, the use of individual liberties and rights to legally argue for ideas

100
Conservative white Christians typically take their faith seriously, which has severe implications
for church schools that incorporate white supremacy, as it requires tackling racism backed by religious
fervor. See id. at 277.
101
Note, supra note 8, at 1436.
102
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976).
103
Christopher W. Schmidt, Beyond Backlash: Conservatism and the Civil Rights Movement, 56 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 179, 189–90 (2016).
104
Id. at 190.

62

117:46 (2022)
Revolution

The Unintended Consequences of the Court's Religious Freedom

and policies is also palatable to the evangelical Christian community—a
group to which white segregationists often belonged.105
Church schools, often founded and created by evangelical Christians,
also rely on the language of individual liberty and rights to justify their
existence.106 Individual rights-based rhetoric provides a more acceptable
method for the work that legally segregated schools accomplished in the
past.107 Thus, it is not incredibly difficult to imagine that the maintenance of
white supremacy has evolved into a succession of purpose between
segregation academies of the past and church schools of the present.
In this Part, I argue that contemporary church schools demonstrate this
succession by staying as segregated as legally possible under the
Constitution.108 And, more importantly, by exercising their unique ability to
protect this purpose under the First Amendment religion clauses, church
schools can avoid future federal restrictions on prowhite indoctrination.109
Section II.A defines two theories of Critical Race Theory: racial realism
and strategic racism and then uses those theories to analyze the outcome of
desegregation in modern church schools. I use racial realism to illustrate how
token legal integration may not necessarily lead to an eradication of white
supremacy in church school education. Instead, a more subtle form of white
supremacy occurs through the continued existence of white dominated
classrooms.
In Section II.B, I use strategic racism to highlight the unique protections
that church schools have under the First Amendment. Using the recent
105
See Balmer, supra note 13; see also Andrew R. Lewis, The Transformation of the Christian
Right’s Moral Politics, 17 FORUM 25, 28–29 (2019) (arguing that the language of individual rights has
been beneficial to white evangelical political mobilization since the 1980s). The compatibility of
individualism to Christianity is not necessarily intrinsic to the Christian faith, instead it is a uniquely
evangelical concept—seen most regularly in southern evangelicalism—which allows southern
evangelicalism to be so compatible with Americanism. See HARVEY, supra note 73, at 45, 70 (providing
an example of how individualism became a tenet of the southern Baptist tradition—a large Protestant
evangelical sect).
106
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 4; see also DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 27 (asserting the proposition
that church schools were founded by mostly non-Catholic Christians in the 1970s).
107
CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 4. The legal attack on church schools in Bob Jones did more than
dismantle complete segregation, it also unified evangelical Christianity with segregationism and pushed
white Christians to act more cohesively as a political body. See id. at 13.
108
See, e.g., DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26 (finding that non-Catholic religious schools remain
majority white); Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 17 (finding that private school students, including
church schools, tend to be mostly white). This is not to suggest that all parents send their students to
private church schools because of white, homogenous classrooms. Parents choose alternatives to public
education for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., id. at 11–17 (discussing virtual schools, charter schools, and
homeschooling). Yet, regardless of intent, the fact that church school classrooms remain majority white
has implications for the continued perpetuation of white dominance through white exclusivity.
109
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 4; see also DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 24–27.
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Supreme Court’s religious aid jurisprudence as an example, I demonstrate
how church schools will be potentially more successful in exercising First
Amendment protections today.
A. Evolving the Purpose: Racial Realism & the Illusion of Integration
The legal victories gained by Black people in the 1950s and 1960s
brought forth a countermovement of political and racial conservatism that
insisted on limits to antidiscrimination policies.110 Racial conservatism’s core
arguments rely on concepts such as the “color-blind” interpretation of laws
and “formal racial equality,” which focuses more on eradicating explicit
types of individual racism and ignoring more subtle forms.111 Once the
Supreme Court started to reinforce these ideas in its legal jurisprudence, the
advancements obtained in the 1950s and 1960s began to stall, or in some
cases, were reversed.112
Considering the delay and reversal of Civil Rights Era victories, legal
scholars—mostly scholars of color—developed Critical Race Theory (CRT)
to establish “new theories and strategies” needed to combat the subtler forms
of racism that emerged after the Civil Rights Movement.113 CRT shares an
intellectual history with critical legal theory and the legal realist work of the
1970s and 1980s in that it relies on the assumption that the law is not neutral,
objective, or apolitical.114 Yet CRT is distinguishable in that it highlights the
ways in which the law has constructed race, which CRT asserts is “not
simply—or even primarily—a product of biased decision-making on the part
of judges, but instead, the sum total of the pervasive ways in which law
shapes and is shaped by ‘race relations’ across the social plane.”115 At its core,
CRT is an intellectual movement that attempts to critically ascertain the

110

See Schmidt, supra note 103, at 190–91.
See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 46
(arguing that color-blind constitutionalists “live in an ideological world where racial subordination is
ubiquitous yet disregarded—unless it takes the form of individual, intended, and irrational prejudice”);
see also Joshua Paul, ‘Not Black and White, but Black and Red’: Anti-Identity Identity Politics and
#AllLivesMatter, 19 ETHNICITIES 1, 4, 6 (discussing the development of color-blind paradigms as a
strategic way of reconstructing status quo race logic in a way that appears “rational”). For an example of
racial conservatism using color-blind constitutionalist logic, see Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
112
See KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW, NEIL GOTANDA, GARY PELLER & KENDALL THOMAS, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xvii, xxviii (1995); see also RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (2d ed. 2012) (providing
a brief summary of Critical Race Theory’s early origins).
113
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 112, at 4.
114
CRENSHAW ET AL., supra note 112, at xviii–xix.
115
Id. at xxv.
111
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relationship among race, power, and the law with the hope of “eliminating
all forms of oppression.”116
I focus on two theories of CRT in this Essay: racial realism and strategic
racism. Derrick Bell, an early pioneer of CRT, developed racial realism in
1992.117 Racial realism acknowledges the permanent and evolutionary nature
of racism in this country, but also frees Black people from the burden of
seeking unobtainable equality.118 Additionally, it puts progressive success
into context as “short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial
patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance.”119 For this reason,
racial realism provides an essential perspective for describing how racism
has become “more subtle though no less discriminatory.”120 Bell’s concept
recognizes that studying racism requires noticing the ways in which racism
adapts and changes to maintain a regime of white supremacy that
subordinates people of color.
Whereas racial realism provides a framework to notice subtle forms of
racism, strategic racism provides a framework for understanding the way that
subtle racism operates in a post-1964 world.121 Importantly, strategic racism,
a term first established by Ian Haney López in 2013, differs from traditional
racism in that it does not involve “discrete acts of bigotry by malicious
individuals.”122 Instead, strategic racism operates as a manipulative and
conscious plotting to gain or maintain white people’s collective
sociopolitical dominance.123 As such, strategic racism is mostly about
strategy and not necessarily overt, malicious racial animus (although it can
include individual racial animus); it operates outside of and in connection
with other ways of maintaining power.124

116
See Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1763, 1763 n.3 (1999); see also Jamel K. Donnor, Lies, Myths, Stock Stories, and Other Tropes:
Understanding Race and Whites’ Policy Preferences in Education, 51 URB. EDUC. 343, 350–51 (2016)
(noting CRT is both a human rights and racial justice project focused on eliminating oppression).
117
Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 373 (1992).
118
See id. at 373–74.
119
Id. at 373.
120
Id.
121
For racial realism, see Bell, supra note 117, at 373–74. For strategic racism, see IAN HANEY
LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND
WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 42, 46 (2014).
122
LÓPEZ, supra note 121, at 42, 46.
123
Id. at 46; see also Donnor, supra note 116, at 351 (citing López to argue that in the twenty-first
century, racism operates strategically to manipulate “existing racial antipathies and ideas of racial differences”
for personal gain).
124
See LÓPEZ, supra note 121, at 46.
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Tokenism, defined as the presence of a few Black individuals in a
majority-white space, is an example of strategic racism in the educational
setting.125 As complete segregation became legally impossible,126 white
supremacists had to accept the presence of some Black students. Generally,
this resulted in most private schools, including church schools, strategically
allowing a small number of Black students to enroll—which some scholars
call “token integration”—avoiding the potential of losing their federal tax
exemption.127 In the years following Brown, federal courts were adamant
about state desegregation in the legal sense, shutting down the private school
loophole.128 This suggests that to avoid violating post-Brown desegregation
cases like Runyon and Bob Jones, private church schools can rely on token
integration—acceptance of Black students in small numbers.129 Yet, the legal
requirement of Black attendance, does require these schools to affirmatively
recruit or retain Black students. Instead, the only requirement is that these
schools do not formally forbid Black students to attend. Thus, tokenism
allows private schools to strategically maintain their white racial dominance
without any threat of actual integration.
For the purposes of this Essay, I define “actual integration” as school
composition reflective of the city in which that school is located.130 Studies
suggest that like other private schools’ students, church school students are
125

See DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26 (providing data on schools mostly consisting of white
students); see also Dorsen, supra note 8, at 40 (providing data on racial isolation in schools).
126
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 582–85. Interestingly, before Green v. Connally
in 1968, some white parents accepted sending their kids to schools with a small number of Black students
so long as the school was not genuinely integrated. See Note, supra note 8, at 1441.
127
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26; CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 4; Dorsen, supra note 8, at 40.
128
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603–04. For an example
of federal courts’ attempts at shutting down the private school loophole before these Supreme Court cases,
see Dorsen, supra note 8, at 44–45 (describing how a federal court in Louisiana rejected any loophole that would
allow states to fund private segregated education).
129
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26.
130
I recognize that city population is not a perfect measure of integration success because not
everyone in a city will identify as religious or even consider sending their children to religious schools.
However, even though church schools are religious, that is not the only factor a parent might consider
when using their right to send their child to a church school. As noted, I believe that there are a variety of
reasons a parent might consider when deciding private versus public school. See Grady & Hoffman, supra
note 27, at 11–17; Ava M. Davis, Why Do Parents Choose to Send Their Children to Private Schools?
(Dec. 2011) (Doctor of Education dissertation, Georgia Southern University), https://digitalcommons.
georgiasouthern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1382&context=etd [https://perma.cc/K8WC-FA3M]).
All parents in a city technically have the right to participate in school choice, so looking at the entire city
demographic is appropriate to determine the level of integration in a particular church school. This will
especially be true now that the Supreme Court’s religious aid decisions allow for public funding to assist
parents choosing church schools. See, e.g., Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1998 (2022)
(holding that states cannot ban religious schools from state private school funding); Espinoza v. Mont.
Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (holding that state that provides tax credits for private
school tuition cannot prohibit parents from using those credits for church schools).
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more likely to be white.131 They are, however, likely to enroll a small number
of non-white students, which displays the illusion of integration and avoids
any legal claims of segregation.132
Admittedly, the presence of Black students at church schools means any
accusation of white supremacy based on segregation must be based on subtle,
indirect separation. Traditionally, the courts viewed desegregation as the
solution to the ills of segregated classrooms.133 As church schools show,
however, a school need not have complete segregation to maintain an
overwhelmingly white classroom.134 In Brown the Court argued that the
problem with separate educational facilities was that such separation denoted
some inferiority on the minority group.135 Such white dominance is lessened–
–but not eradicated––in schools that remain majority white with only a token
number of Black students. Therefore, as the racial realism theory emphasizes,
white supremacy in church schools exists in a subtler form today but the
consequences are just as serious.136
In fact, this more subtle adaptation of white supremacy may be harder
to dismantle than complete segregation because the subtle adaptation appears
to comply with integration. In this system, white supremacists can defend
these subtler forms of white supremacy with race-neutral terms, such as
“school choice” and “free exercise of religion.”137 It is no surprise, then, that
some scholars have argued that white supremacy “was reborn in the civil
131
Grady and Hoffman, including church schools in their study, found that “private school students
are more likely to be white.” Grady & Hoffman, supra note 27, at 17. Professor Jongyeon Ee found that
white students make up the majority of enrollments in non-Catholic religious schools. See Jongyeon Ee,
Gary Orfield & Jennifer Teitell, Private Schools in American Education: A Small Sector Still Lagging in
Diversity, 16 (Mar. 5, 2018) (UCLA Civ. Rts. Project Working Paper), https://www.civil
rightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/private-schools-in-americaneducation-a-small-sector-still-lagging-in-diversity/Ee-Orfield-Teitell-Private-School-Report_03012018
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD2A-D8SL]. The National Center for Education Statistics does provide data for
racial demographics of private schools, and such information can be searched for online. See Search for
Private Schools, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/privateschoolsearch/
[https://perma.cc/RJ9E-2AVL]. For the purposes of this Essay, however, I will assume that prior studies
are correct in concluding that private church schools maintain majority white spaces. A future study could
elaborate on this claim by examining the enrollment patterns of traditional private schools, private church
schools, and public schools, controlling for geographical location.
132
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26.
133
See Champagne, supra note 7, at 60.
134
See Ee et al., supra note 131, at 16 (providing data that white students make up a great majority of
enrollment in non-Catholic religious schools).
135
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), supp’d, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
136
See Bell, supra note 117, at 373 (arguing “abstract legal rights” will only cause discrimination to
become more subtle).
137
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 13; see also Schmidt, supra note 103, at 183, for an explanation
of how white supremacists transitioned to race-neutral terms to accomplish racist outcomes.
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rights era, not irreparably weakened.”138 This is especially true when white
supremacy converges with religion: whiteness becomes sacred, so white
supremacists can protect it with a religious fervor.139
B. Protecting the Purpose: Strategic Racism & First Amendment
Protections
Although all private schools can use the strategy of tokenism to
maintain white supremacy in their schools, the religion clauses of the First
Amendment protect only church schools.140 The First Amendment prohibits
Congress from making any law that would affect the free exercise of
religion.141 Because church schools are religious institutions, they fall under
the protection of the First Amendment.142
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court addressed the connection
between a state’s interest in education and the fundamental rights inherent in
the First Amendment clauses.143 In Yoder, the Court held that balancing
between these two interests is necessary when it comes to parents’ rights to
govern “the religious upbringing of their children.”144 Thus, some
segregationists thought the First Amendment would protect them from the
private desegregation requirements in Runyon if schools were converted to
church schools.145 This strategy failed because in Bob Jones the Court had
held that the federal government could require religious schools to prohibit
official racial discrimination in admissions and in policies without violating
the First Amendment.146
138

See Rolph, supra note 64, at 6.
Paul Harvey discusses in detail how whiteness becomes sacred in the South through Christianity.
Harvey, supra note 73, at 151. See also id. at 118–52.
140
In Runyon v. McCrary, which required desegregation in private nonsectarian schools, the Supreme
Court stated that the constitutionality of “private sectarian schools that practice racial exclusion on
religious grounds” was not raised and chose not to answer that question. 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1967).
Additionally, in the 1970s, some segregated schools assumed that their status as “church schools” would
protect them from desegregation requirements and from losing their tax exemptions. See CRESPINO, supra
note 8, at 9.
141
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
142
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1972) (holding a parent’s right to instruct
the religious upbringing of their children is protected under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause).
Notably, in Bob Jones, the Court specifically addressed a First Amendment question because of Bob
Jones’ religious affiliation. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983).
143
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–14.
144
Id. at 214. The Court limited the preference for religious free exercise with a balancing test in
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–90 (1990), but it was later resurrected by Congress’s
passing of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356–57
(2015).
145
See CRESPINO, supra note 8, at 9.
146
See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 603–04 (finding when the government interests are compelling
enough, such as in this case, regulations prohibiting religious conduct can be allowed).
139
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Bob Jones, however, does not nullify the strategy of using religion to
protect against racial discrimination prohibitions. In that case, the Court
decided to impose restrictions on free exercise in religious schools because
of racial discrimination, and it did so by using a balancing test.147 The
government’s compelling interest in “eradicating racial discrimination in
education” outweighed the burden placed on religious liberty by removing
tax-exempt status for schools with racially discriminatory admission
policies.148 The strength of First Amendment protections enjoyed by religious
schools depends on how a given court balances the interests presented.149 The
current Supreme Court’s religious school funding cases suggest strong
investment in protecting religious institutions’ First Amendment interests.150
Though not related to racial animus or discrimination, the Court’s recent
decisions in Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran provide evidence of the Court’s
impulse to support religious claims under the First Amendment.151 In both
cases, the majority applies the strict scrutiny standard to laws that
“discriminate” against religious educational institutions.152 Strict scrutiny
means that the Court will protect the religious interest unless the government
has a compelling interest that is narrowly tailored to justify burdening
religious free exercise.153 Typically, laws decided under this standard are held
to be unconstitutional.154 In Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that Missouri
could not prevent Trinity Lutheran from applying for a public benefit
program for schools and daycares simply because it was a church.155
Likewise, and relying on Trinity Lutheran, the Court held in Espinoza that
Montana’s decision to prevent state scholarship aid from being used at

147

Id. at 604.
Id.
149
Id. at 603–04.
150
See, e.g., Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1998 (2022) (holding a state funding
private schools must fund religious schools); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261
(2020) (holding a state that grants tax credits for private school tuition cannot prohibit parents from using
that money for religious schools); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012,
2025 (2017) (holding the state’s reimbursement program for nonprofits could not discriminate against
religious nonprofits).
151
See generally Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2262; Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021. For the purposes
of this Essay, I am saying that these decisions are not related to racial animus or discrimination. However,
a study on school choice suggests that these kinds of cases have racial consequences because they
authorize “pluralism and diversion from the common school” without benefitting the most disadvantaged
students. Minow, supra note 45, at 843.
152
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257; Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021.
153
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
154
Id.
155
Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2019, 2025.
148

69

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

church schools unconstitutionally burdened “religious schools” and “the
families whose children attend or hope to attend them.”156
On December 8, 2021, the Court heard a third case, Carson ex rel O.C.
v. Makin, which also looks at whether a state funding program—this time in
Maine—must provide tuition aid directly to sectarian schools if other private
schools are given aid under the state program.157 The Maine program
provides students with a voucher for private school tuition when no public
school is in their area, so long as the school is not religious.158 Like Trinity
Lutheran and Espinoza, the Court in Carson held this practice violated the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.159 Taken together, these
decisions indicate that First Amendment protection for church schools,
curbed in Bob Jones, is not moot. On the contrary, the current Court seems
to endorse this protection—opening the door for church schools to engage in
practices that further white supremacy.
In Trinity Lutheran, Espinoza, and Carson, the Court repeatedly notes
its reliance on the fact that the state in question allowed funding to some
private schools and as such, cannot discriminate against church schools.160
But this does not control against any fear of the maintenance of white
supremacy in these schools. State and local assistance riddles the history of
segregation academies and church schools.161 Ironically, under the Court’s
new religious aid jurisprudence, the state aid to schools that maintained white
spaces, which was “no longer common” in the 1970s,162 may become
common again.
The Court’s school funding jurisprudence highlights a more general
concern about church schools and future constitutional challenges. In the
funding cases, we see the current Court’s inclination to find in favor of
religious liberty when balancing rights under the Constitution. Strategically,
church schools may successfully resist constitutional challenges to white
supremacy in education in areas going beyond lack of full integration (e.g.,
school choice strategies and church school curriculums).163 As church
schools perpetrate a subtle form of white supremacy expressed in nonracial
156

Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2261.
Carson ex rel. O.C. v. Makin, 142 S. Ct. 1987, 1993 (2022).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 2000.
160
Id. at 1996; Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2256; Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021.
161
See supra Part I.
162
Champagne, supra note 7, at 58.
163
Specific church school curriculum is outside the scope of this project. However, I briefly point to
examples of ways in which curriculum may become a contentious battle in the future for church schools.
Future research could expand upon this point and investigate the specific details of church school
curriculum.
157
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terms, the loophole created by Trinity Lutheran and its progeny will not
likely arise in the context of legal claims to resegregate schools or to maintain
otherwise explicitly racist policies.
As early as Brown v. Board of Education, the Court recognized that
“awakening [a] child to cultural values” is a principal function of
education.164 Even though this recognition was the foundation of
desegregation, later in Runyon v. McCrary the Court held that, in private
schools, “it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to
send their children to educational institutions that promote the belief that
racial segregation is desirable.”165 This assumption, balanced with racial
exclusion, resulted in a peculiar jurisprudence from the Court: curricula
upholding values based in white supremacy are acceptable under the
Constitution so long as the school teaching such a curriculum does not
exclude students based on race.
In Family Values, Professor Seth Dowland describes evangelical
church schools as uniquely situated to teach nationalism and American
exceptionalism because these schools must “establish that America
possessed religious foundations.”166 For example, Liberty Christian
Academy, a Virginia church school that originated as a segregation academy,
included strong patriotic language in its original pamphlets, such as:
“Patriotism is a part of our program. Our students are taught to love this great
nation and to respect her. We have never had an anti-American
demonstration.”167 While patriotism is not intrinsically bad, language that
suggests that America is without faults prevents students from engaging in a
critical study of this nation’s past and erases the experience of minorities and
other groups who have been the bearers of American oppression. This school
is still operating today and could be state funded under the Court’s current
aid jurisprudence.168
Additionally, these schools rely on textbooks—few of them written by
minority authors—that uphold “traditional [American] values.”169 Curricula
that preserve American nationalism and exceptionalism, along with
traditional values, might serve the theological purpose of connecting
Christianity to America’s founding.170 However, such curricula may also
164

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), supp’d, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
166
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 39.
167
Id. at 29.
168
See About LCA: History, LIBERTY CHRISTIAN ACAD., https://www.lcabulldogs.com/about-lca/
[https://perma.cc/NM6W-WKHK].
169
DOWLAND, supra note 11, at 26.
170
Id. at 39–40.
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function to maintain a vision of America that is rooted in whiteness and
dominance.171 The end goal is to indoctrinate new generations of students,
both white and Black, with the cultural values of white supremacy. In that
sense, the peculiar position the Court highlighted in Runyon is a perfect
example of racial realism.172 Perhaps ironically, the Court encourages white
supremacy to evolve in a way that is seemingly equal: schools may also
indoctrinate Black students with curriculum that upholds white dominance.173
CONCLUSION
The relationship between contemporary church schools and white
supremacy goes beyond the mere categorization of a “segregation academy.”
Given that most contemporary church schools could dispute a segregation
academy classification, they are uniquely situated to preserve a subtler form
of white supremacy without serious criticism. These schools strategically use
racial tokenism to maintain an illusion of integration. This illusion satisfies
legal suspicion without being unpalatable to white supremacists desperate to
keep the exclusionary nature of whiteness. The Court’s religious aid
jurisprudence has empowered this strategy.
The strategy of using church schools to maintain white supremacy is
efficient because churches, unlike other private schools, have explicit
constitutional protection under the First Amendment’s religion clauses.
These clauses supply a safe space for church schools to teach a curriculum
glorifying the role of whiteness and dominance in American history without
contradiction.174 Therefore, church schools continue to exist as predominately
171
This is not a new way of preserving white supremacy. In fact, the scholar Michael Fuquay states
that one of the main reasons for creating private segregated academies was to protect against the “federal
government [using] the schools to promote alternative values.” Fuquay, supra note 62, at 160.
172
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (holding that “the Constitution . . . places no
value on discrimination” but also that parents have the right to send their children to schools that promote
racial segregation).
173
Interestingly, this position was the result of the Court applying the First Amendment’s Freedom
of Association Clause and not its Free Exercise Clause. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176. Yet, as previously
demonstrated, the Free Exercise Clause provides another layer of protection for church schools. Anyone
attempting to question or challenge a contemporary church school’s curriculum or dogma as racially
discriminatory would face an opponent equipped with the Freedom of Association Clause on the one
hand, and the Free Exercise Clause on the other—strengthening the odds of winning for the church school
faced with a constitutional challenge.
174
Although beyond the scope of this project, it would be interesting to compare and contrast the
current 1619 Project with the curriculum taught at church schools. The 1619 Project Curriculum,
PULITZER CTR., https://pulitzercenter.org/lesson-plan-grouping/1619-project-curriculum [https://
perma.cc/3EGF-UP2B]. This curriculum is controversial in general, but any acceptance of it in the publicschool system would be unenforceable in most private schools—with church schools having the strongest
claim against any mandatory adoption. For 1619 Project controversy, see Sarah Schwartz, Lawmakers
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white institutions, which can teach whiteness in the classroom while also
relying on the protections of the First Amendment. As a result, these schools
continue to instill students with cultural values rooted in white supremacy.
In Bob Jones, the Court explicitly held that the government has a
“fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in
education.”175 This Essay demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s new
approach to public funding for religious church schools has—whether
intentionally or not—placed its interest in eradicating racial discrimination
in education in a vulnerable position.

Push to Ban ‘1619 Project’ From Schools, EDUC. WK. (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.edweek.org/teachinglearning/lawmakers-push-to-ban-1619-project-from-schools/2021/02[https://perma.cc/FV7A-7VLU]
(examining the bills in states designed to prohibit the 1619 Project from public classrooms).
175
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
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